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Abstract
Background:  Effective health protection requires systematised responses with clear accountabilities. In England,
Primary Care Trusts and the Health Protection Agency both have statutory responsibilities for health protection. A
Memorandum of Understanding identifies responsibilities of both parties, but there is a potential lack of clarity about
responsibility for specific health protection functions. We aimed to investigate professionals' perceptions of responsibility
for different health protection functions, to inform future guidance for, and organisation of, health protection in England.
Methods: We sent a postal questionnaire to all health protection professionals in England from the following groups:
(a) Directors of Public Health in Primary Care Trusts; (b) Directors of Health Protection Units within the Health
Protection Agency; (c) Directors of Public Health in Strategic Health Authorities and; (d) Regional Directors of the
Health Protection Agency
Results: The response rate exceeded 70%. Variations in perceptions of who should be, and who is, delivering health
protection functions were observed within, and between, the professional groups (a)-(d). Concordance in views of which
organisation should, and which does deliver was high (≥90%) for 6 of 18 health protection functions, but much lower
(≤80%) for 6 other functions, including managing the implications of a case of meningitis out of hours, of landfill
environmental contamination, vaccination in response to mumps outbreaks, nursing home infection control, monitoring
sexually transmitted infections and immunisation training for primary care staff. The proportion of respondents reporting
that they felt confident most or all of the time in the safe delivery of a health protection function was strongly correlated
with the concordance (r = 0.65, P = 0.0038).
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Conclusion: Whilst we studied professionals' perceptions, rather than actual responses to incidents, our study suggests
that there are important areas of health protection where consistent understanding of responsibility for delivery is
lacking. There are opportunities to clarify the responsibility for health protection in England, perhaps learning from the
approaches used for those health protection functions where we found consistent perceptions of accountability.
Background
Are responsibilities for health protection in England clear?
One of the consequences of the 2002 changes to NHS
structures was a change in the organisations, and in some
cases the individuals, responsible for health protection.
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) took on the previous roles of
District Health Authorities, which had been defined in the
1977 National Health Service (NHS) Act [1]. These
included the duty to promote health, to provide services
and to prevent and treat illness. Guidance to the health
service identified these as including "arrangements for the
control of communicable disease and infections, and for
dealing with the health aspects of non-communicable
environmental hazards" [2].
Figure 1 shows how health protection responsibilities
have developed in England since 1977. It identifies key
reports and consultations, national policy developments,
and the organisations and workforce responsible for
health protection. In the period up to 2002, responsibility
for health protection for any geographical area lay within
a single organisation, the District Health Authority. Their
functions were clarified and strengthened following two
major outbreaks. The first was an outbreak of food poi-
soning at Stanley Royd Hospital in 1984, which led to the
deaths of 19 patients, and the second an outbreak of
legionnaires disease in Stafford General Hospital in 1985,
which caused the deaths of 22 people. A committee of
inquiry into the Stanley Royd outbreak identified a lack of
clear accountability for investigation and intervention as a
contributory factor [3], and at the time many District
Health Authorities did not have adequate capacity to
respond to such outbreaks [4]. As a result, a Government
review of public health (the Acheson report) led to Dis-
trict Health Authorities investing leadership in the post of
the Director of Public Health (DPH) with clear responsi-
bility for public health and health protection [5]. This role
was further strengthened by the introduction of specialist
Consultants in Communicable Disease Control, who led
teams working to the DPH, incorporating surveillance,
TB, community infection and outbreak control functions.
Following the 2002 reorganisation of the NHS [6], the
health protection responsibilities of District Health
Authorities transferred to PCTs, which retained the statu-
tory role of Director of Public Health [1]. The specialist
health protection workforce initially transferred to PCTs
in support of their Directors of Public Health. It had long
been recognised, however, that varying approaches had
been taken to health protection between Health Authori-
ties, and further dispersal of responsibility across a much
larger number of PCTs would be likely to exacerbate this
[7]. The Health Protection Agency (HPA) was established
a year later, aiming to create a stronger and more unified
health protection system, and intending to bring together
the specialists involved in health protection in a single
organisation with national specialist functions (such as
specialist laboratory and epidemiological services, mak-
ing these more akin to the Centers for Disease Control in
the United States) and local health protection teams [8].
This development aimed to provide a national focus and
consistency to the delivery of health protection. The spe-
cialist health protection workforce largely moved into the
HPA, apart from those carrying out community infection
control functions who remained within PCTs.
On its establishment in 2003 the HPA was responsible for
supporting other bodies, including PCTs, in carrying out
their health protection roles [9]. The HPA Act of 2004 also
gave it direct responsibility for protecting the community
from infectious and non infectious environmental haz-
ards. However, PCTs were still statutorily responsible for
arrangements for the control of communicable disease
and non-infectious environmental hazards, as defined in
the 1993 guidance to the health service [1].
Hence up to 2002 there was a single organisation respon-
sible at a local level for health protection, but there was
significant variation across England in health protection
practice. After 2004, there was a much greater critical mass
within the national HPA and the potential for more
national consistency of practice, but at a local level both
PCTs and the HPA had statutory responsibilities for health
protection. Unless the roles of each organisation were
clearly defined, there was the potential for individuals
locally to be unclear about their leadership and support
roles in carrying out different health protection functions.
Prior to the establishment of the HPA and PCTs, Health
Authorities employed teams to provide their specialist
health protection functions. These included: consultants
in communicable disease control responsible for the full
range of health protection functions; infection control
and TB control nurses, responsible for infection control in
primary and community care facilities and for TB control;
surveillance staff responsible for surveillance of notifiableBMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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and other important infectious diseases; and administra-
tive support staff. Despite PCTs retaining statutory respon-
sibilities for health protection from 2003, they largely
relied on local Health Protection Agency teams (Health
Protection Units – HPUs) to provide this service on their
behalf. HPUs mainly consist of the specialist staff previ-
ously employed by Health Authorities, aside from com-
munity infection control nurses who mostly remained
with PCTs.
The local arrangements to hold HPUs to account for pro-
viding this service are based on a Memorandum of Under-
standing. This is based on a national template but has no
legal or statutory basis, and it is not expected on its own
to achieve uniformity of arrangements across England. It
simply reflects agreements between the HPA and the local
NHS, for example identifying the role of the HPU in mon-
itoring and surveillance to give early warning of outbreaks
of infection, and the responsibility of the PCT in commu-
nity infection control. In the case of a community out-
break, it usually identifies the Director of Public Health as
having overall responsibility for managing the response to
the outbreak, and the HPU for carrying out most outbreak
control functions on their behalf.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, whilst arrangements
often work well, implementation has varied across Eng-
land, partly reflecting the inherited NHS variation in serv-
ice provision. This variation may also reflect variation in
geographical distribution of public health specialists
responsible for health protection as well as wider public
health functions[10]. It might also reflect the dispersal of
the public health workforce following the 2002 NHS
changes, and the skills gaps identified in the wider public
health workforce, particularly in health protection[11].
Alongside the fact that both PCTs and the HPA have stat-
utory health protection roles, these factors may add to a
lack of clarity about who is responsible for delivering spe-
cific health protection functions locally, and a lack of
capacity to deliver those functions. If responsibility for
Health Protection Responsibilities in England Figure 1
Health Protection Responsibilities in England.
Reports
Policy on health protection
Organisations with statutory responsibility
Health Protection Agency
Primary Care Trusts PCTs merge
District Health Authorities
Strategic Health Authorities   SHAs merge
Health Protection workforce
1977 //        1988 1993      //     2002   2004                 2006
1977 NHS Act
Duty of NHS bodies to promote 
health, provide services & to 
prevent & treat illness
Director of Public Health in 
District Health Authorities, 
supported by Consultant in 
Communicable Disease 
Control & their teams
2002 Director of Public 
Health in PCTs supported by 
Consultants in Communicable 
Disease Control & their teams
2002 Director of Public 
Health in Strategic Health 
Authorities responsible for 
performance management of 
PCT health protection 
functions.
2003 Consultants in 
Communicable Disease 
Control and their teams 
(apart from some 
infection control staff) 
transfer to HPA
1984 Stanley 
Royd Hospital
Outbreak of 
food poisoning 
kills 19 
patients [3].
1985 
Stafford
Legionnaires 
disease 
outbreak 
kills 22 
people[13]
2002 ‘Getting ahead of the 
Curve’ strategy for 
controlling infectious 
diseases proposes 
establishing the Health 
Protection Agency [7].
1988 Acheson 
report
recommends 
Consultant in 
Communicable 
Disease posts in 
District Health 
Authorities [5]
2004 Health Protection 
Agency Act gives 
accountability for the 
HPA to protect the 
community from 
infectious disease
1993 Health Service guidance
gives District Health Authorities 
responsibility for arrangements for 
control of communicable disease 
and health aspects of non-
communicable environmental 
hazards [2]
2002 functions of 
District Health 
Authorities 
identified in 1993, 
guidance transferred 
to PCTs [6].
2003 Ministerial 
Directions identify 
role for HPA to 
support other bodies 
including PCTs in 
discharging health 
protection functions 
[9]
District Medical 
Officer in District 
Health 
AuthoritiesBMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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delivery is not clear, significant health protection prob-
lems could be unresolved with individuals considering
the responsibility to lie with others rather than acting
themselves. Inquiries into past health protection incidents
in different countries have often identified a lack of clarity
as to who is responsible as a major contributing factor
[3,12,13]. Equally there is widespread international recog-
nition that systematised responses with clear responsibil-
ities for health protection and other healthcare incidents,
are required for responses to be effective. This includes the
control of infection [14,15], disaster planning [16,17] and
patient safety [18].
The purpose of this survey was to assess the extent of var-
iation in the interpretation of health protection arrange-
ments between PCTs and local health protection teams. In
particular it aimed to investigate the perceptions of those
who are involved in delivery and oversight of health pro-
tection as to whose responsibility it is to deliver specific
health protection functions, who delivers them in reality,
and to identify issues that need urgent attention. Under-
standing any differences in perceptions can then inform
both the development of the Health Protection Agency
and of PCTs, particularly as new arrangements develop in
the light of current NHS organisational changes[19]. It is
also of relevance to judging the adequacy of health protec-
tion arrangements in different countries.
Methods
We undertook a questionnaire survey of key health profes-
sionals responsible for health protection in England dur-
ing 2005.
Participants
The participants in this study were: (a) Directors of Public
Health in Primary Care Trusts; (b) Directors of Health
Protection Units within the Local and Regional Services
Division of the Health Protection Agency; (c) Directors of
Public Health/Medical Directors in Strategic Health
Authorities and; (d) Regional Directors of the Health Pro-
tection Agency [see Additional File 1 for further details of
sampling frame].
Questionnaire design, pilot and mailing
A steering group, comprising representatives of each of the
four participant categories listed above, designed the
study and managed its implementation. The steering
group agreed that the study needed to elicit from the four
groups of participants ((a) to (d) above): (i) perceptions
of the role of the relevant organisations in delivering a
range of key health protection functions and; (ii) percep-
tions of the confidence in safe delivery of these functions.
In order that the study could provide timely feedback for
policy makers it was agreed that a questionnaire using cat-
egorical responses would be used to elicit this informa-
tion. Five responses were permitted for (i) above: "PCT
alone"; "led by PCT with HPA support"; "led by HPA with
PCT support"; "HPA alone" or "other", with an option for
respondents to clarify their response using free text. A four
point scale was used for (ii) above, with responses ranging
from "confident all the time" to "not confident". The
steering group chose the health protection functions to
include in the survey on the basis that they represented a
diverse range of activities that, together, represented a sub-
stantial proportion of the health protection functions
undertaken in England.
The questionnaire was piloted on a convenience sample
of 13 individuals that included all four groups of partici-
pants listed above. The aim of the pilot was to highlight
ambiguous questions and unforeseen problems with the
questionnaire. The steering group considered the findings
of the pilot, including the feedback of the pilot partici-
pants, and extra questions were inserted to reflect the fact
that some health protection responses (such as meningitis
contact tracing) might be different depending on whether
they were required during normal working hours or out-
side of these hours.
The revised questionnaire was then sent by post to all par-
ticipants in the study. A second questionnaire was sent to
non-responders four weeks after the initial mailing.
Analysis
Questionnaire data were analysed using with STATA 9.0
[20], using the individual responder (n = 264) as the unit
of analysis. We defined a response as 'concordant' if a
respondent's views of who should and who does deliver a
particular health protection function described the same
lead organisation. Subgroup analyses were undertaken
within participant groups (a) to (d) in the responders who
provided their job title (n = 260).
See Additional File 1 for further details of the pilot data
and approaches to data coding.
Results
Questionnaires were sent to 374 individuals in the four
participant groups. 264 were returned, an overall response
rate of 70.6% (Figure 2).
Who should be delivering particular health protection 
functions (Figure 3)?
There was variation in the expressed views of who should
be delivering a particular health protection function
among individuals undertaking similar health protection
role. For example, of those individuals with a PCT role,
17% stated that the health protection response to a single
case of meningitis should be led by the PCT, whereas 76%
stated that it should be led by the HPA (Figure 3a, PCTBMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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roles, bars with dark shading). Furthermore, there was
also variation in expressed views of who should be deliv-
ering a particular health protection function between
groups of professionals undertaking different health pro-
tection roles. For example, whilst only 17% of individuals
with a PCT role stated that the health protection response
to a single case of meningitis should be led by the PCT,
41% of individuals with an HPU role believed that this
health protection response should be led by the PCT (Fig-
ure 3a, PCT and HPU roles, bars with dark shading). Var-
iation, both within and between different professional
roles, in the expressed views of who should be delivering
was apparent across a diverse range of health protection
functions (Figure 3). Although it is not straightforward to
identify a single unifying theme for these health protec-
tion functions, many of these health protection duties
(e.g. Figure 3a,d,e) form a substantial part of the overall
health protection function at a local level.
Who is delivering particular health protection functions 
(Figure 3)?
We also identified variation in views of who is delivering
a particular health protection function among individuals
undertaking a similar health protection role. For example,
of those individuals with a PCT role, 35% stated that the
health protection response to a single case of meningitis
was led by the PCT, whereas 55% stated that it was led by
the HPA (Figure 3a, PCT role, bars with light shading). In
addition, we found variation in views of who is delivering
a particular health protection function between groups of
professionals undertaking different  health protection
roles. For example, 65% of individuals with an SHA role
stated that the health protection response to a single case
of meningitis was led by the PCT; in contrast, only 35% of
individuals with a PCT role expressed this view (Figure 3a,
SHA role and PCT role, bars with light shading).
Is there concordance between views of who should, and 
who is, delivering health protection?
The concordance of respondents' views of who should
and who is delivering each of the 18 health protection
functions included in the survey is summarised in Table 1.
Note that a response is defined as 'concordant' if a
respondent's views of who should and who does deliver a
particular health protection function described the same
lead organisation. The six health protection functions
Numbers and Responses by Participant Group Figure 2
Numbers and Responses by Participant Group.
          205
            303
30
       34
        28
            22
                    9
                7                       7
Overall response rate: 264 questionnaires returned of 374 sent, response rate 70.6%
Questionnaires sent
PCT Directors of Public 
Health
Directors of Health 
Protection units
67.7% response rate from 
PCT Directors of Public 
Health
88.2% response rate from 
Directors of Health 
Protection Units
SHA Directors of Public 
Health/Medical Directors
HPA Regional Directors
78.6% response rate from 
SHA Directors of Public 
Health/Medical Directors
77.8% response rate from 
HPA Regional DirectorsBMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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Perceptions of who should be, and who is, delivering health protection functions amongst respondents with PCT, HPU, SHA  and RDHPA roles: low concordance response Figure 3
Perceptions of who should be, and who is, delivering health protection functions amongst respondents with PCT, HPU, SHA 
and RDHPA roles: low concordance response.
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
a. Handling of a single case of meningitis 
out of normal working hours
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
b. MMR vaccination program for university students
in response to a large mumps outbreak
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
c. Investigating an apparent cluster of congenital anomalies
attributed in media reports to a nearby landfill site
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
d. Delivery of infection control and reduction of
healthcare acquired infections in private sector nursing homes
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
e. Monitoring rates of sexually transmitted infections
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
0 20 40 60 80 100
percent
RDHPA
SHA role
HPU role
PCT role
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
other
mainly HPA
mainly PCT
f. Immunisation training programmes for primary care staff
who should be delivering?
who is delivering?
†  Percentages in RDHPA column are based on only seven subjects and should therefore be interprete
with caution.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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with the lowest concordance (range 75 – 80%) are
included in Figure 3; those with intermediate concord-
ance (range 83 – 90%) and high concordance (range 90 –
98%) are shown in the additional files [see Additional
Files 2 and 3 respectively].
Confidence in the safe delivery of health protection
The percentage of respondents expressing that they felt
confident most or all of the time in the safe delivery of
particular health protection functions (Table 2) ranged
from 51% (infection control in private sector nursing
homes) to 97% (handling of a single meningitis case dur-
ing normal working hours). Mean confidence levels
(across all eighteen health protection functions) were
79% in respondents with a PCT role; 76% in respondents
with an HPU role; only 68% in respondents with an SHA
role and; 73% in Regional Directors of the Health Protec-
tion Agency. There was a strong correlation between the
concordance of respondents' views of who should and
who is delivering each of the 18 health protection func-
tions and the confidence in the safe delivery of these func-
tions (r = 0.65, P = 0.0038).
Health protection functions of concern
Whilst there is no obvious threshold at which we should,
using our data, identify health protection functions that
raise concern about the clarity and safety of their delivery,
there are a number of health protection functions with
low expressed concordance (≤80%) and low expressed
confidence (≤80%) (Tables 1 &2). These were: delivery of
an MMR vaccination programme for university students
in response to a large mumps outbreak; investigating an
apparent cluster of congenital anomalies attributed in
media reports to a nearby landfill site; delivery of infec-
tion control and reduction of healthcare acquired infec-
tion in private sector nursing homes; monitoring rates of
sexually transmitted infections; and immunisation train-
ing programs for primary care staff. These health protec-
tion functions are either proactive, or permit a short
period of planning before mounting a response (although
a rapid response to public concerns and media enquiries
may be needed). We highlight immunisation training
programs for primary care staff as an area where subopti-
mal delivery of the training programs may have little or no
measurable short-term impact on the success of immuni-
sation programs; conversely, by the time it noticeably
impacts on the success of immunisation programs it may
take years to correct.
Conversely, some health protection functions which are
infrequently required, but for which a complex multi-
agency response is immediately required (such as
responding to a factory fire with a potential release of
harmful chemicals) had high levels of concordance (91%
in normal hours; 86% outside normal hours) and rela-
tively high levels of confidence (82% in normal hours;
72% outside normal hours), especially considering that
most of the professionals surveyed would never have been
called on to respond to such an incident.
Table 1: Percentage of respondents with PCT, HPU, SHA and RDHPA roles expressing concordant* views of who should, and who 
does, deliver particular health protection functions.
Respondent
Health protection function All PCT role HPU role SHA role RDHPA †
Handling of a single meningitis case during normal working hours 98 98 100 90 100
Handling of a single meningitis case out of normal working hours 78 77 85 80 83
Establish/ensure effective operation of outbreak control team for 3 linked meningococcal cases 94 93 100 91 100
Establish/ensure effective operation of outbreak control team for 4 community legionnaires' cases. 92 89 100 100 100
Improving uptake of MMR vaccine in under 2 year olds. 84 85 83 73 100
Immunisation training programs for primary care staff 80 82 83 68 57
MMR vaccination program for university students in response to a large mumps outbreak 76 75 86 68 86
Infection control & reduction of healthcare acquired infections in primary care premises 86 87 83 86 71
Infection control and reduction of healthcare acquired infections in private sector nursing homes 77 76 82 81 57
Infection control & reduction of healthcare acquired infections in community hospitals 83 82 80 89 83
Development of a local strategy for improving sexual health 93 93 97 91 71
Monitoring rates of sexually transmitted infections 79 77 87 86 100
Organisation of the rota for out of hours health protection arrangements 84 82 93 91 86
Factory fire with release of harmful chemicals during normal working hours 92 93 90 86 86
Factory fire with release of harmful chemicals out of normal working hours. 86 85 96 85 83
Managing an outbreak of tuberculosis in a secondary school. 90 88 90 100 100
Investigating an apparent cluster of congenital anomalies attributed in media reports to a nearby 
landfill site
75 73 93 70 71
Managing a look-back exercise in response to a surgeon carrying hepatitis C 90 90 83 95 100
* We defined a response as 'concordant' if a respondent's views of who should and who does deliver a particular health protection function 
described the same lead organisation.
† Percentages in RDHPA column are based on only seven subjects and should therefore be interpreted with caution.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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Discussion
Main findings of this study
For twelve of the eighteen health protection functions sur-
veyed in this study, there is a high level of concordance
(above 80%) in respondent's views as to which organisa-
tion should be, and which organisation is, delivering the
particular functions. For these functions, the responsibil-
ity for health protection appears to be clearly understood.
Indeed, the confidence expressed in the safe delivery of
these functions also tended to be high.
However, five health protection functions had low levels
of expressed concordance (≤80%) and also low expressed
confidence (≤80%) (see "Health protection functions of con-
cern" above). It is tempting to attempt to find a unifying
theme for these functions, but perhaps all one can defini-
tively conclude is that these represent a diverse range of
health protection functions. One unifying theme, how-
ever, is that these health protection functions do not
require an immediate response to an emergency. In con-
trast, we found relatively high levels of concordance and
confidence in other health protection functions, many of
which appear to require the specialist expertise of the HPA
and some of which require an immediate response to an
emergency situation.
This study therefore suggests that there are some areas of
health protection where consistent understanding of
responsibility for delivery may be lacking. That is, people
at the point of delivery may be unclear as to who is in
charge, and who is responsible for delivering the function.
It is possible that the changes in the organisational struc-
ture for health protection may have contributed to the
lack of clarity for some health protection functions.
What is already known on this topic
Reports into previous major health protection incidents
have indicated that clarity of responsibility and accounta-
bility for delivering health protection functions is of
utmost importance in safe and efficient response to health
protection incidents [1,3,12,13]. It is also recognised
internationally that systematised responses, with clear
responsibilities for health protection and other healthcare
incidents, are required for responses to be effective. This
includes the control of infection [14,15], disaster plan-
ning [16,17] and patient safety [18]. The establishment of
the post of Consultant in Communicable Disease Con-
trol, following the "Acheson report" into the public health
function in England [5], aimed to provide clear accounta-
bility for this function, with overall responsibility taken
by the Health Authority Director of Public Health.
Whilst this system did give clarity of accountability, it also
resulted in a dispersed and varied system of health protec-
tion expertise across Health Authorities in England, with
some isolated practice and the potential for a lack of resil-
ience [1,7]. The Health Protection Agency was established
to resolve this by bringing together health protection
expertise into a single agency [8]. This aimed to ensure
that a well co-ordinated response could be mounted to
Table 2: Percentage of respondents expressing confidence * in the safe delivery of particular health protection functions amongst 
respondents with PCT, HPU, SHA and RDHPA roles.
Respondent
Health protection function All PCT role HPU role SHA role RDHPA †
Handling of a single meningitis case during normal working hours 97 97 100 91 100
Handling of a single meningitis case out of normal working hours 91 90 96 89 100
Establish/ensure effective operation of outbreak control team for 3 linked meningococcal cases 94 93 97 95 100
Establish/ensure effective operation of outbreak control team for 4 community legionnaires' cases. 92 91 100 90 100
Improving uptake of MMR vaccine in under 2 year olds. 74 77 67 59 71
Immunisation training programs for primary care staff 75 79 70 55 43
MMR vaccination programme for university students in response to a large mumps outbreak 75 77 69 68 57
Infection control & reduction of healthcare acquired infections in primary care premises 67 72 55 41 67
Infection control and reduction of healthcare acquired infections in private sector nursing homes 51 53 57 32 33
Infection control & reduction of healthcare acquired infections in community hospitals 73 78 64 44 71
Development of a local strategy for improving sexual health 69 74 60 50 33
Monitoring rates of sexually transmitted infections 60 61 67 50 43
Organisation of the rota for out of hours health protection arrangements 86 86 87 85 100
Factory fire with release of harmful chemicals during normal working hours 82 83 77 82 86
Factory fire with release of harmful chemicals out of normal working hours. 72 74 69 58 67
Managing an outbreak of tuberculosis in a secondary school. 90 89 93 95 100
Investigating an apparent cluster of congenital anomalies attributed in media reports to a nearby 
landfill site
60 62 57 52 50
Managing a look-back exercise in response to a surgeon carrying hepatitis C 83 80 92 90 100
* the proportion of respondents stating that they were "confident all of the time" or "confident most of the time".
† Percentages in RDHPA column are based on only seven subjects and should therefore be interpreted with caution.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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any health protection incident, with the ability to bring
national expertise in any field of health protection to bear
quickly as required.
The development of this new system has, however, led to
a lack of certainty as to responsibilities for delivery of
health protection functions at a local level, in particular
between PCTs and Health Protection Units. Although the
legislative basis of accountabilities for health protection is
based on historical functions of previous organisations
and functions of the HPA, there is still lack of certainty
about delivery of key activities [1].
What this study adds
Successful health protection arrangements require abso-
lute clarity as to who is in charge and who delivers which
aspects of a health protection response in any particular
circumstance. This study shows that, whilst this is the case
for many aspects of health protection in England, for
many functions there are different perceptions as to the
organisation that is responsible. Perceptions differ both
within particular organisations (for example, within
PCTs) and also between professional groups working in
different organisations. Associated with this lack of cer-
tainty as to who is responsible, are lower levels of confi-
dence in the safe delivery of these health protection
functions. Our findings suggest that action needs to be
taken to improve the clarity of delivery of some health
protection functions. Perhaps a good starting place for
policy makers would be to examine the approaches (such
as guidelines) that were previously employed to clarify
responsibility for those health protection functions where
we found high levels of concordance and confidence. This
may provide valuable guidance as to how to improve clar-
ity of responsibility consistently across all health protec-
tion functions.
Limitations of the study
We surveyed the self-reported perceptions of the partici-
pants, but we did not corroborate these reports with data
from actual responses to specific health protection inci-
dents. Clearly, whilst perceptions are important, they do
not necessarily reflect whether the actual response to
health protection incidents is appropriate and safe. For
example, individuals working within PCTs and HPUs
could recognise that responsibilities are not always clear,
and develop mechanisms to address this locally. The lack
of clarity identified in this study does not therefore neces-
sarily relate to lack of safe delivery in practice.
Our survey included eighteen health protection functions,
some of which were closely related (for example, in work-
ing hours and out of working hours responses to a menin-
gitis case). These eighteen functions do not encompass all
health protection functions, nor are they a fully represent-
ative sample of all health protection functions or of the
workload of any of the four different professional groups
surveyed (indeed this would be difficult to assess, since
some health protection incidents occur infrequently).
Rather, they were chosen by an expert steering committee
to illustrate a broad range of scenarios where clarity of
responsibility and accountability is important. They
reflect mainly reactive rather than proactive functions.
Therefore, our report that five of eighteen functions
(28%) lacked clarity of responsibility needs to be inter-
preted with some caution – a higher or lower proportion
could have been obtained by a different choice of ques-
tion. Furthermore, there is no obvious definition of an
acceptable level of concordance or confidence in
responses to our survey. Whilst we have highlighted
health protection functions with levels of expressed con-
cordance and confidence ≤80%), any threshold we could
have chosen would have been subjective. We would,
therefore, advocate a qualitative rather than a quantitative
interpretation of our findings.
Crucially, however, our survey did show important areas
where improvements in clarity are required.
Our survey was limited in the depth of information we
obtained as it was based on categorical responses. The
steering group agreed that this was a necessary design fea-
ture for timely completion of the survey given impending
organisational change in the National Health Service and
Health Protection Agency in England. Therefore, we uti-
lised free text responses only to minimise misclassifica-
tion of categorical responses. If time had allowed, we
might have supplemented our study with an in-depth
qualitative study (for example, employing semi-structured
interviews) study to develop a thorough understanding of
the issues and to explore the reasons for particular
expressed views. Indeed, there may be an opportunity to
follow up our findings in this way.
It is possible that biases could have been introduced due
to non-response or due to coding practices. We did not
survey the non-respondents or collect detailed informa-
tion on their characteristics. However, even in the extreme
situation that the characteristics of the responders and
non-responders were very different, the bias is very
unlikely to have been of sufficient magnitude to materi-
ally alter our findings (response rate 70.6% overall; range
67.7% – 88.2% across the organisational groups). Coding
practices are also unlikely to have introduced biases of sig-
nificant magnitude. For example, we did not include
"don't know" responses when estimating the proportion
of participants who were confident "all or some of the
time" in the safe delivery of a health protection function.
If such responses actually reflected a lack of confidence
then we may have overestimated confidence levels. How-BMC Public Health 2006, 6:297 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/297
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ever, only eight "don't know" responses were encountered
over all questions and respondents (maximum of three
don't know responses per question), so the extent of any
bias introduced is likely to be very small indeed. Again,
our findings would not have been materially altered by
our coding approach.
Finally, whilst we surveyed professionals involved in
health protection in England, we did not extend our study
to other countries, where the organisational structure for
health protection functions may differ. Our findings are
therefore unlikely to be directly generalisable to other
countries. However, clarity of accountability of health
protection functions is an important issue internationally
and the lessons learned from effective implementation of
health protection do have an international relevance.
Conclusion
In the context in which this study was undertaken, that is,
related to health protection functions that require timely
and complex interventions often involving many agencies
and/or components of the NHS, we would argue that clar-
ity of accountability is crucial. However, we found that
this clarity was lacking for several important health pro-
tection functions. This study indicates that improvements
in clarity of responsibility for health protection in Eng-
land are required. The current re-organisation of PCT and
Strategic Health Authority boundaries, alongside changes
taking place within the HPA to strengthen their frontline
services, provides an opportunity to address these issues.
With a move to a smaller number of larger PCTs and pos-
sibly Health Protection Units, there is opportunity for
greater clarity of arrangements.
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